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ABSTRACT
As a bottom-up mechanism of direct democracy, recall can be triggered by citizens to
remove elected officials through a vote, which is expected to increase accountability.
Contradicting this hope, previous research has suggested that intensive use of recall
referendums became an instrument of party competition. However, empirical
evidence is scant. Thus, focusing on the 107 attempts of activating recall in
Colombia during the first half of 2017 this article seeks to understand if recall
activations are more likely to reinforce democratic governance (by giving an
institutional solution to exceptional problems of legitimacy) or are more likely to
erode it (by becoming a weapon to escalate the partisan competition beyond
regular elections). We created a dataset to identify who started the recall – partisan,
mixed or civil society actors – and for what reasons. Then, we examined to what
extent the effective number of parties in the council, the majority reached in the
previous election, or the size of the municipality have an effect on the likelihood of
recall attempts. The study finds that in Colombia, political leaders (and not specific
parties) are the main actors promoting recall.
ARTICLE HISTORY Received 5 June 2017; Accepted 15 November 2017
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Introduction
The recall referendum is a mechanism to allow the removal of an elected official from
office before his or her term is complete. When recall is activated by the authorities (that
is, by parliament against the executive, referred to as “top down”) its logic is similar to
an impeachment, but with the extra step of requesting popular legitimation of the
decision taken by the parliament or council (for example the impeachment of Roma-
nian president Traian Băsescu that was ratified by a referendum on 29 July 2012).
When the mechanism is activated by signature collection (through what is known as
a “bottom-up” procedure) it is named “direct recall” (for example, the case of Venezue-
lan President Hugo Chávez on 15 August 2004 who was confirmed in office).
In Tsebelis’ words, bottom-up mechanisms of direct democracy (MDD) (for
example, direct recall) allow citizens to become collective veto players1 and, in doing
so, increase social accountability. However, while an abrogative referendum or a
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citizens’ initiative is oriented to reduce the distance between representatives’ actions and
citizens’ preferences, the recall referendum engages in a more delicate task given that its
main goal in the short term is not to “reduce distance” (for example, promoting or pre-
venting a policy or institutional change) but to remove the authority.
As Whitehead stresses in his introduction to this special issue, recall is not a new
mechanism; however, the practice used to be relatively rare until recently. Latin
America is probably the most prolific region introducing regulations to activate
recall, with 10 countries offering national or subnational laws in this regard. The
same is applicable for the practice of recall, with more than 5000 referendums registered
in Peru (the world’s most intensive user of recall referendums), around 1000 attempts
registered in Ecuador and hundreds in Bolivia and Colombia.2
The main question of this article is whether recall works as a mechanism to reinforce
democratic governance (by giving an institutional solution to exceptional problems of
legitimacy) or on the contrary, erodes it (by becoming a strategy of party competition).
We suggest that recall will work as an instrument of democratic governance if it is
mainly activated by civil society actors with the aim of holding the challenged poli-
ticians accountable. Whereas it will work as an instrument of party competition, if it
is mainly activated by political parties or leaders to reach strategic goals out of excep-
tional political struggles, scandals, or conflicts.
This article builds on the findings provided by the study of the Peruvian case, which
suggests that in Peru recall is used as a “party strategy”3 or party competition. Here, the
lack of political party system institutionalization is combined with deep structural pro-
blems such as poverty, and insufficient water and energy supplies. At the same time,
there is an increase of municipal resources and control of local and regional govern-
ments by new parties that are not well connected with national parties. All these
factors create a scenario in which self-interested politicians find fertile grounds for pol-
itical manipulation. In other words, recall procedures may offer incentives in cases
where a politician’s behaviour prioritizes personal interest over public interest or insti-
tutional stability. However, previous research has been based on systemic characteristics
of the cases rather than on micro-level data. Thus, more evidence is required to
strengthen (or contradict) the idea that parties act (only) strategically and do not
lead civic claims for accountability.
Colombia shares some of the features described above. To a lesser extent than
Peru, the Colombian case also shows a considerable number of attempts at activat-
ing recall. But contrary to Peru, none of these referendums have succeeded thus far.
Following a recent amendment of the recall regulation, 107 formal requests were
made in the first half of 2017 alone, compared to 161 attempts between 1995
and 2015. This means that if this trend continues, the number of attempts will
reach a similar level as in the previous 20 years before the end of the year. In
Colombia, the process to activate a recall referendum starts with the registration
of a commission. Available data on local elections allow us to identify the promo-
ters, and check if they have participated in previous elections and or if they are
affiliated with political parties or are members of civil society organizations. This
is complemented by newspaper articles to identify other reasons not detailed in
the formal requests. These conditions and data availability make Colombia an
ideal case for in-depth analyses of recall through the collection of systematic evi-
dence on the conditions of recall activation.
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The article is structured as follows: first, an overview of recall in Latin America is
provided; then, a theoretical framework is offered; third, methodology and case
selection are presented; fourth, the analysis is offered and finally, conclusions are
drawn.
The Latin American regulation and use of recall
The recall referendum arrived in Latin America shortly after its introduction at the
United States (US) subnational level,4 in 1923 and 1933, to Cordoba and Entre Ríos pro-
vinces, respectively, both in Argentina; and to Yucatan, Mexico in 1938. It was also
introduced in the Constitution of 1940 in Cuba.5 However, while practice increased
slowly in US cities and states showing a constant increase until now,6 the mechanism
remained a “dormant institution”7 in the south of the continent.
This scenario has changed since the 1990s, when several countries replaced their
constitutions and introduced recall referendum together with many other mechanisms
of direct and participatory democracy. This occurred in Colombia in 1991, Ecuador in
1998 and 2008 (two constitutions were approved in this period), Peru in 1993 and
Venezuela in 1999. At the subnational level, recall spread in Argentinian provinces
and Mexican states. Other forms of recall have been introduced in Costa Rica where
indirect recall is available at the local level to ratify the removal of executive authorities
by the Council. Panama stands out as the most exceptional case. Here, recall is designed
to resolve internal conflicts within a party, forcing party discipline.
Regarding the jurisdiction, Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador and Venezuela are among the few
countries in the world that permit all elected authorities to be challenged by a recall
referendum.8 However, in Cuba, this means that only the delegates at the lowest
state level can be removed by a referendum because all others are elected by delegates
and not the populace.9
Table 1 offers an overview of the spread of direct and indirect recall in Latin America
and shows the different frequencies of activations. Institutional designs diverge in
relation to who can be removed by recall (that is, which authorities or bodies), for
what reasons (specified or not), the period of activation (any time, after the first year
in office, or before the last year), the number of signatures and the time to collect
them, and the actions taken if the authority is removed (replaced by substitutes or
call of new elections).
The case of Ecuador shows how the changes in the institutional design dramatically
affect the number of activations. In its first introduction in the constitution of 1998,
recall activations were allowed in two situations: acts of corruption and failure to
accomplish the electoral programme. Surprisingly, in corruption cases, a judicial sen-
tence was required. From 1998 to 2007, no referendums took place. Then, the consti-
tution of 2008 reformulated the recall referendum as a political and participatory
right (that is, loss of confidence in the elected authority was enough to trigger a
recall), and reduced the number of signatures to 15%. Soon, the number of attempts
jumped to almost 1000 (784 officially registered between 2010 and 2011). The insti-
tution was reformed again, and since May 2011 requisites are higher, having an
evident effect on reducing the number of attempts, which drastically fell to fewer
than 100.10
Something similar happened in Peru, where the 2013 reform of the law entered into
force for the following period had a clear effect, which can be expected to intensify in
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future calls. In the period 2012–2013, around 2000 attempts ended in referendum, while
in the following period only 236 referendums were organized.11
Other studies also show that attempts of activating recall tend to happen with more
frequency in both very small units (where it is easier to activate a referendum) and capi-
tals (where the prize of winning is higher for political actors).12 In the Peruvian case,
more than 90% of recall referendums held between 1997 and 2012 took place in com-
munities with an electorate of fewer than 5000.13 The next section will explore these
issues from a theoretical perspective.
Theoretical discussion
Recall is defined as an instrument that promotes accountability. The idea behind the
regulation of recall referendums is to introduce a mechanism to allow the public to
sanction representatives who stray from their promises or their duty to serve their
constituents. In other words, it is expected to work as a safety valve for exceptional
conflicts. However, institutionalist theories have for a long time argued that insti-
tutions do not produce linear or automatic outcomes and may lead to results not
originally intended.
Table 1. Recall regulation in Latin America.
Country Type of recall
Year of
introduction Authorities Attempts* Votes
Argentinaa Direct and
indirect
1923–1996 Executive and legislative authorities
at the subnational level
12
(1923–2014)
2
Bolivia Direct 2009 All elected authorities 216
(2012–2013)
0
Colombia Direct 1991 Executive authorities at the
subnational level
278
(1994–May
2017**)
41
Costa Rica Indirect 1998 Executive authorities N/d 0
Cuba Direct 1976 All elected authorities* N/d N/d
Ecuador Direct 1998–2008 All elected authorities 897
(1998–2016)
78
Mexicob Direct 1938–2017 Executive and legislative authorities
at the subnational level
2 0
Panamac Indirect 2004 Legislative authorities N/d N/d
Peru Direct 1993 Executive and legislative authorities
at the subnational level
22,000
(1997–2016)
5304
Venezuela Direct 1999 All elected authorities 167
(1999–2013)
10
Note: *The attempts refer to the commissions registered or kits sold (in the case of Peru) oriented to start a
process. Numbers are approximate due to the difficulties of accessing complete and accurate information.
**In the case of Colombia, the number for 2017 covers the attempts registered between January and May. Source:
own summary based on constitutions, laws and information provided by official electoral institutions.44
aIn Argentina, recall is regulated at the provincial level in Chaco (1957), Chubut (1994), Córdoba (1923, 1987), Cor-
rientes (1960), La Rioja (1986), Rio Negro (1988), Santiago del Estero and Tierra del Fuego (1991); other provinces
provide recall for municipalities, namely, Entre Ríos (1933, not included in later constitutions), Neuquén (1957),
Misiones (1958), San Juan (1986), San Luis (1987). It is also included in Ciudad de Buenos Aires (1996).45
bIn Mexico, recall is regulated in Oaxaca (1998), Morelos (2011), Guerrero (2013), Zacatecas (2014), Aguascalientes
(2014) and Nuevo León (2016), Mexico City (2017). Interestingly, the two attempts registered in Yucatán and
Chihuahua led to interventions of the National Judicial Court and the declaration of illegality of the recall,
which was removed from the respective constitutions but introduced in many other states.46
cIn Panama, art. 151 of the Constitution establishes recall, which can be used within a political party to remove
representatives. It may include popular consultation. The same article mentions that electors could request a
recall of members of parliament.
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In some Latin American countries, direct recall is defined as a political right (for
example, in Peru until 2013, “general dissatisfaction” was enough to initiate a recall
process without need of arguments or proof). In other countries, such as Colombia
or Ecuador, a formal reason able to be “technically” assessed by electoral bodies is
required. In all these countries, recalls have won momentum. A first explanation of
this trend could be the crisis of representative democracy. Contemporary societies
are characterized by a growing split between the citizenry and the institutions of repre-
sentative democracy, especially political parties and parliaments. According to some
scholars, such a crisis would lead to an increase of direct interventions of citizenry in
the political arena.14
According to the accountability approach, the reasons behind single activations of
recall could be based on the rejection of the authority’s performance (direct account-
ability) or by the rejection of concrete policies (indirect accountability). Research on
Japan has shown how recall can be used as a means of “indirect accountability”.15
This happens when such referendums are used due to the absence of other mechanisms
to directly influence a given policy. In the Andean countries, given the growing presence
of conflicts regarding mining, water resources, land and other natural resources, recall
could be used in this way (that is, to express discontent with authorities in the absence
or miss-functioning of other mechanisms of control and decision-making).
However, the literature on bottom-up MDDs underlines the difficulties of activating
a process of direct consultation, which often produces high costs in terms of human and
financial resources.16 In this vein, political parties could be more willing than other
actors (for example, labour unions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and indi-
vidual citizens) to undertake such an endeavour. Scholars have suggested that political
parties are not necessary against direct democracy and may even profit from it. The
Uruguayan and Italian experiences demonstrate how useful referendums can be to
mobilize and increase the visibility of a new party in the political arena.17 Extending
the previous argument, recall may work as a strategy for party competition.
However, even if parties could use different devices to mobilize the electorate as hap-
pened in these cases, the consequences of promoting or vetoing laws are not equivalent
to the consequences of removing authorities before the end of their term. While the first
pressures for more accountability and or more negotiations between countries, the
second interrupts the mandate and has the potential of creating problems of
governability.
The activation of recall may be associated with either exceptional situations (scandals
or crises), or with contexts of high political instability. Then, two until now uncon-
nected bodies of literature could suggest explanations to understand the pattern of
recall activations: On the one hand, the literature on presidential interruptions; on
the other hand, the studies of political party system institutionalization and, in particu-
lar, the growing body of literature explaining parties’ behaviour at the Latin American
subnational level, where recall is more frequently activated.
In his work on impeachments, Pérez-Liñán observed that “recent impeachments
constitute the tip of the iceberg of a much broader emerging trend in Latin American
Politics”.18 The use of recall at the subnational level could be the ignored expression of
this new trend towards more instability and new patterns of partisan struggle. Scholarly
research has approached the issue of “interrupted presidencies” or “presidential break-
down”19 considering institutional and non-institutional factors and, particularly, the
role of oppositions (and situations of divided government) and social mobilization in
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contexts of crisis in interrupting a mandate. Among these studies, elite power struggle
and popular support commonly play a major role.
Studies based on subnational politics have emphasized the negative consequences of
the erosion of party system institutionalization on governability. In extreme cases, the
lack of social rootedness and political parties’ low probability of survival from one elec-
tion to the next could promote anti-system behaviour.20 In such contexts of weak party
system institutionalization, actors could be incentivized to activate recall referendums
and call for new elections.21 It is possible to further suggest that a new definition of pol-
itical organization could be behind recall activations. More than a structured organiz-
ation, it would refer to leaders fighting for power in contexts of institutional weakness
due to flexible and unstable links between groups (inter parties, intra party and includ-
ing parties and social movements).22
In cases like Colombia, different networks of local political actors often move easily
from one party label to another (often literally buying the place on the list) or, even,
running for positions in more than one party. Thus, the party becomes an electoral
machine oriented to win votes (programmatic issues do not matter). In fact, it works
as a franchise23 in which each local leader specializes in a specific segment of the elec-
torate (as a market).24 As a result, the link with the electorate is based on clientelist net-
works in which (brokers) are more relevant than party labels due to the evident lack of
social rootedness.25 This produces a scenario of extremely low levels of party system
institutionalization26 that increases the incentives to activate recall referendums as a
power game.27
Research design
We propose that recall will work as a mechanism of democratic governance when it is
activated to hold elected politicians accountable. This is more likely the case if is acti-
vated by civil society actors and is related to exceptional situations of crisis, scandals or
highly controversial policies. Alternatively, we expect recall to be an instrument of party
competition if it is mainly activated by partisan leaders, especially, the losers of the pre-
vious election, and is not related to exceptional conflicts.
We do not assume that civil society activations are “good” and party activations are
“bad” but we believe that they follow a different logic due to the specific reason to acti-
vate recall. When a crisis or a scandal is related to the activation, the goal is more likely
increasing accountability and to improve democratic governance. However, when there
is no special reason (that is, exceptional) to activate recall and the main initiator is a
party or a leader who lost in the previous election, recall is more likely to erode demo-
cratic governance by introducing instability. Obviously, there can also be mixed situ-
ations in which both, political leaders and civil society actors join efforts to activate a
recall.
Case selection
In Colombia, the recall referendum was included by the constituent assembly in the new
constitution of 1991. The assembly was organized as an answer to the movement known
as “la séptima papeleta” (the seventh ballot), which requested a constitutional reform to
end violence, narcoterrorism, corruption and increasing citizenship apathy. Abstention
was and still is a characteristic of Colombian politics. Notably, the level of abstention in
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the elections for the constituent assembly reached 75%. During the debates, the defi-
nition of recall referendum in relation to programmatic vote was discussed and
approved. It obliges candidates running for office to register a government plan.
Once in the post, if a recall is activated arguing that the mayor is not fulfilling the gov-
ernment plan, the programme presented during the campaign is used by the electoral
body to assess the validity of the request.
Since the mechanism was introduced by Law 134 in 1994 until 2015, 161 attempts
led to 41 referendums and none of them succeeded since the threshold of participation
was not reached (see Table 2).
In 2015, a new law (303/2015) reduced the number of signatures required to activate
a recall referendum (from 40% to 30% of the total of votes obtained by the elected auth-
ority) and the threshold required to validate the vote, which if it is not reached does not
lead to a decision even if there is a majority in favour of removing the authority (drop-
ping from 50% to 40% of valid votes on the day of the elections of the challenged auth-
ority). As with the previous regulation, recall can be activated after the first year in
government and before the last. The change in the regulation accelerated the recall
attempts’ registration, leading to a considerable increase in their number. In only five
months (January to May), 107 attempts were registered.
Data coding
We identified a “recall attempt” as the formal intention of removing an authority from
office initiated through the presentation of a request at the “Registraduría”. This process
has to have a speaker or representative of the request (normally includes a list of people
supporting the request, identified as the “Comisión Promotora”). Any citizen, social
organization, party or political movement can technically initiate the request. The
Registraduría has eight days to decide. If the request fulfils the formal requirements,
it is allowed to start the signature collection which must be completed within six
months.28 Data are taken from Registraduría.
The promoter(s) are the speaker and supporters of the formal request presented at
the Registraduría. We coded as “political party in the opposition” when the speaker or a
relevant number of members of the commission ran for office in previous electoral
competitions (like, that is, in in the case of the city of Sabanagrande where the commis-
sion has only one member and he did run for office in the previous election). We coded
Table 2. Recall attempts in Colombia from 1995 to May 2017.
Mandate
Requests
presented
Requests
approved
Recall
referendums
Authorities removed by
recall
1994–1996 23 5 5 0
1997–1999 10 6 6 0
2000–2002 16 5 5 0
2003–2006 28 10 10 0
2007–-2010 49 11 3 0
2011–2014 35 14 12 0
2015–May 2017* 107 * * *
Total 1995–2015 161 51 41 0
Total
(provisional)
268 51 41 0
Note: The duration of the government’s term was three years until 2007 and afterwards increased to four. *Until 23
May 2017. Source: own summary based on Misión de Observación Electoral (MOE).
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it as “political party in government” with the same criteria, but this time considering
that members of the commission are from the same party as the mayor (like in the
city of San Jacinto del Cauca, where the promoters did campaign for the “Partido de
la U” in the previous election, and later on joined forces to recall a mayor from the
same party). We coded it as “civil society” when none of the members have formal
links with parties (that is, no party affiliation was identified and the members did
not run for office in previous elections, but we did find enough information on the pro-
moters to proceed with the coding; this is the case of Villarrica where none of the eight
members of the commission was identified as a member of any party but they were
recognized as civil leaders). We coded it as “mixed” when the commission had a rel-
evant number of both partisan and nonpartisan actors and the partisan actors are
not leaders of parties (for example, this is the case of Zambrano, with eight members
in the commission, some affiliated to a party and some from civil society). Names of
promoters were taken from the Registraduría (requests presented and accepted) and
promoters’ affiliations were identified through electoral databases giving names and
parties running for office (executive and legislative) complemented by Google searches
of profiles.
To identify the reasons to activate recall all the formal requests presented at the
Registraduría were analysed. This information tends to be general – the most
common reason is non-fulfilment of the government plan – thus, we complemented
the research with media analysis searching national and local newspapers including
also Twitter and Facebook accounts (social networks proved an interesting source of
information to assess local campaigns). In order to observe if frequent activations of
recall referendums correlate with other social, environmental or violent conflicts, we
also compared our cases with datasets on mining and environmental conflicts as well
as with the list of territories most affected by the peace agreement with the Revolution-
ary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).29 Surprisingly, data do not suggest a corre-
lation between other conflicts and recall activation. For our study, even if the dataset
cannot be conclusive, it offers enough information regarding the promoters, the
reasons for the activation and the political context of authorities challenged by recall
attempts.
To observe the likelihood of suffering a recall referendum by different types of actors,
we included data on the affiliation of the mayor (his or her party, movement and or
coalitions). We included the electoral results (electoral support) obtained by the execu-
tive and the difference to the second party to test whether a clear triumph decreases the
likelihood of suffering a recall process. Finally, the effective number of parties was con-
sidered based on our own calculations using Laakso and Taagepera’s (1979) model and
data from the “Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil”. The size of the municipality
measuring the number of registered electors was also included. Data were taken from
population projections of the “Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística”
(DANE).30
Analysis
Our dataset covers all attempts registered between January and May 2017 – a total of
107. Two governors (Quindío and Córdoba) and 85 mayors were challenged by
recall processes. On some occasions, an authority was challenged by more than one
request (for example, in Barrancabermeja, Bogotá and Planeta Rica, four commissions
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were registered; in Orito, Ocaña and Yopal, three were registered). This reduces the total
number of municipalities with recall attempts, but still offers an impressive share of all
municipalities (almost 8%, or 85 of circa 1122) given that we are only looking at pro-
cesses initiated in the first half of 2017. Data to test if these municipalities display higher
discontent with the government’s performance, greater dissatisfaction with democracy
or with public services delivery are unavailable. However, some studies show that
Colombian local governments share the Latin American trend of dissatisfaction with
local governments (see mainly the “Red Cómo Vamos” programmes in the country’s
most important cities),31 associated with the above-mentioned split between citizens
and parties, municipal councils and the resulting crisis of representative democracy.
The first finding of our research refers to the promoters of recall referendums, who
are mostly partisan actors. From the 107 commissions registered, we found data for 97.
In 60 cases (61.8% of all cases), the speaker or most of the members of the commission
ran for positions with other parties in a previous election (2015 and/or 2011). In two
cases the promoters had supported the mayor in the election of 2015. In 27 cases
only civil society actors initiated the request and in eight cases we found mixed commis-
sions of civil and political party members.
Recall requests are mostly oriented towards the government programme. Rather
than scandals or other events, the most common accusation refers to dissatisfaction
and lack of fulfilment of the government programme. On a few occasions, corruption
is also part of the argument (for example, San Benito and Palmito in Sucre, Yopal in
Casanere; Lorica in Cordoba). There is no correlation between recall activations and
the territories previously in the hands of FARC. In the same vein, only two of our
cases were included in the dataset of mining conflicts (Montelíbano and Tasco). We
further find no evidence linking the wave of referendums to environmental conflicts.
There are cases in which both claims are present (for example, Bogotá and Ibague)
but this does not seem to be the explanation for the recall attempt.32
These findings suggest that the recall referendum, even if not an exclusive weapon in
the hands of parties (note that 27.8% of the cases were not promoted by party
members), is increasingly adapted to be part of the electoral competition. Most of
these recall attempts resemble the “impeachment strategy”, pointed out by Pérez-
Liñán, used with the intention of interrupting mandates through institutional mechan-
isms. In other words, a vast majority of attempts are typically led by partisan leaders and
only to a lesser extent by actors of civil society.
However, even when the commission was coded as belonging to civil society, our
complementary research showed that in several cases there was a former public contrac-
tor whose licence was revoked by the new government, which suggests that the recall
could be a kind of revenge. There are only eight cases classified as “mixed”.
However, again, some of these recalls have been launched by former public contractors
who lost their contracts with the new administration (for example, the cases of Neiva,
San Cayetanos, Barrancavermeja, Planada, Guamo and Trujillo).33
Figure 1 shows that attempts are especially – but not only – concentrated in the
centre and on the Caribbean coast, regions characterized by the presence of small muni-
cipalities, strong patronage structures and an electoral machinery.34 There, the citizens’
electoral support is given based on a precarious equilibrium between political leaders
(for example, a congressmen) and brokers (for example, councillors and neighbour-
hood leaders) who are able to provide selective incentives to voters (on clientelist
bases). Departments (an administrative level between municipalities and national
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governments) with more attempts include Bolivar (12), Tolima (7), Cesar, Córdoba,
Cundinamarca, Magdalena (each 6) and Valle del Cauca (5); however, there are
many others registering one to four attempts in their municipalities.
Regarding the type of parties, there is no clear evidence suggesting that some parties
(for example new vs traditional parties) or movements (for example, indigenous people)
are more likely to face recall referendums. Even if some parties face more recalls than
Figure 1. Recall in Colombia.
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others, this is linked to the number of local governments in the hands of these parties.
The correlation is not strictly proportional but suggests a reasonable connection. For
instance, parties that performed well in the elections of 2015 (Cambio Radical,
Partido de la U, Partido Liberal and to a lesser extent Partido Conservador) face
more recalls; for example, the Partido de la U governs in 16% of municipalities and
faces 15.7% of total attempts. The situation of the Partido Conservador Colombiano
is a bit better, with 13.8% of municipalities in their hands and 7.8% of recall processes.35
Something similar applies for coalitions and independent candidacies (“Movimientos
Significativos de Ciudadanos”, launched by a number of signatures). All, traditional
or new parties, social movements and independents are equally affected by the chal-
lenge of recall.
However, it would be a mistake to assume that recall is oriented to a given political
party or a group of political parties stable over time. On the one hand, following Sar-
tori’s definition of political parties,36 Colombian parties should be characterized by
low levels of institutionalization, especially, after the end of the traditional bipartisanism
Liberal – Conservador in 2002.37
On the other hand, high levels of factionalization are evident since the 1990s, produ-
cing “electoral micro-enterprises”.38 In this sense, the driving force behind recall refer-
endums seems to be systemic and behavioural features. In other words, the high level of
party fragmentation and factionalization has fed an extraordinary capacity of pragmatic
adaptation, producing organizations characterized by extremely low levels of
structuration.39
At the local level, political organizations allow candidates to manage their own sup-
porters with a high level of autonomy, and conduct different types of alliances and
exchanges to arrive to power. However, parties are weak in both their internal organ-
ization and cohesion as well as in their links to citizens. The coalitions supporting a can-
didate are not consistent over time. Our data show that many times the same leaders
who supported the candidate during his or her campaign are the sponsors of the
recall attempt (for example, the cases of Bucaramanga and Buenavista). This contradicts
the common belief assuming that majority governments are protected from these
attempts and explains why shortly after an election a new mayor could be challenged
by a recall process even if he or she has reached a majority at the previous election.
Regarding the electoral support, as Figure 2 shows, the mayors challenged by a recall
attempt gained office with the support of 20% to 70% of the electorate, with a median
higher than 45%.
The fragmentation of the political party system is also evident in the effective
number of parties with seats in the council. However, further research is required to
explore the extent to which the existence of a divided government makes a great differ-
ence in the activation of recall referendums or, complementary to the explanation, to
the extent to which the weakness of the system incentivizes the mentioned “impeach-
ment” strategies. In fact, in most of our cases, the effective number of parties is equal or
larger than three, and in 75% it is higher than six. This reveals the existence of extreme
multiparty systems, usually characterized by high transaction costs (between the gov-
ernment and the municipal council) (Figure 3). It potentially increases the incentives
to initiate recall proceedings because of the weakness of the mayor.
It is commonly assumed that small municipalities will be more likely to experience
recall attempts, given the easiness of collecting signatures as is suggested by the case of
Peru.40 Thus, the size of the municipality would be correlated with a greater number of
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recall activations. Our data show that attempts are concentrated in small and median
municipalities. Of these, 75% are located in municipalities with fewer than 50,000
inhabitants. With a few exceptions (for example, Bogotá, where all mayors in the pre-
vious two decades have been challenged by recall announcements,41 or Bucaramanga,
Cúcuta and Neiva), recall activations are not registered in the biggest municipalities.42
However, more research is needed given that this is also related to the higher number of
small municipalities.
The activation of recall referendums by political actors in small municipalities could
be explained not only by the easiness of collecting signatures but also by the incentives
offered in a system in which only the executive is perceived as a relevant prize. Then, the
local council is mostly viewed as a trampoline to develop a political career at the
Figure 3. Effective number of parties.
Figure 2. Votes received by challenged mayors.
1390 Y. WELP AND J. P. MILANESE
departmental or national level. In bigger cities, the council tends to be stronger and
offers more incentives for politicians (in terms of patronage distribution and access
to different kinds of public contracts), while also being able to increase the acceptance
of the rules of the game. In this context, in small municipalities, the losers have greater
incentives to activate recall referendums against the winner, even if it is unsuccessful, as
is happening in Colombia. The attempt of activating a recall referendum could be seen
as a form of campaigning and a way to erode the credibility of the mayor (Figure 4).
Finally, it has been suggested that the low turnout facilitates the activation of recall in
systems such as Colombia’s as well as some US cities43 in which the number of signa-
tures is related to the turnout registered at the election of the mayor. In Colombia, some
municipal elections are characterized by remarkably low turnouts (that is, with mayors
elected with the participation of less than the 35% of the electorate). However, our data
Figure 4. Size of municipalities facing recall attempts.
Figure 5. Turnout in municipalities facing recall attempts.
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show that more than 75% of the municipalities facing recall attempts display high levels
of turnout, even slightly higher than the media states (Figure 5).
Conclusions
In this article we delved into the relationship between recall activations and party com-
petition in Colombia. Our main goal was to systematically analyse to what extent the
conditions under which recall is activated are likely to reinforce democratic governance
by giving an institutional solution to exceptional problems of legitimacy. However, pre-
vious literature suggested that the result could also be the erosion of democracy if recall
becomes a weapon to escalate the partisan competition beyond regular elections, pro-
ducing instability. In order to analyse these questions, we focus on identifying who is
behind recall attempts (partisan bodies, civil society or mixed actors) and for what
reasons recall is activated (exceptional crisis vs no outstanding reasons). We also
analyse to what extent electoral support, situations of divided government, the size of
the municipality and the turnout registered in the last election correlate with the
number of activations.
Our findings suggest that recall is mostly a weapon in the hands of partisan actors.
Sixty percent of the commissions promoting recall were coded as composed by
members of opposition parties, while the reasons behind most of these activations
were not related to exceptional crisis. We found no correlation between mining and
environmental conflicts as well as the territories most affected by the implementation
of the peace agreement with our recall dataset.
The findings are strong enough to confirm that recall is not contributing to reinfor-
cing democratic governance in Colombia. Moreover, in a number of commissions
launched by civil society actors or by mixed actors we found that the activations
were triggered by former state contractors whose connection to government ended
after the last election. This supports the idea that in Colombia recall attempts are
more frequent in areas dominated by clientelist networks, opening avenues for
further research on this connection.
Our data show that a robust electoral support obtained in the previous election is
no guarantee for governability, while the formal and informal alliances built prior to
an election can easily end once in government. In other words, the volatility of
coalitions tends to rapidly produce divided government regardless of the electoral
support achieved by the major (in other words, even majority governments could
quickly become divided governments). However, this does not only refer to party
competition, given that party labels do not always play a major role. The decisive
driver of recall is the (changing) political support of individuals in a scenario of
high fragmentation and personalization of politics. Support occurs due to a delicate
balance based on the sum of various political leaders and their capacity to sustain the
clientelist network. Accordingly, the logic behind most of the attempts of removing
an executive from office can be compared to the electoral weakness leading to a pre-
sidential impeachment. However direct recall gives a role to citizens in the process of
signature collection and in the vote and also becomes a tool for other actors (for
example, contractors).
Recall attempts are more frequent in small municipalities. This could be related to
the incentives (political prizes) that this kind of district produces, as well as to strat-
egies related to the political projection of the opponents. However, this trend has
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also been observed in other places, from Peru to Poland capitals or big cities are also
challenged by recall, indicating that further research is required to arrive at conclus-
ive results.
Our findings invite policy makers to rethink whether the need to increase legitimacy
and conflict resolution, especially in the context of the peace agreement implemen-
tation, should be answered by facilitating the activation of institutions like recall.
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